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SITE DEVELOPMENT IN DEEP KARST TERRAIN 
 
Thomas P. Hart, P.E., R.G.   Giuliana Zelada-Tumialan, P.E.  
Black & Veatch Corporation   Black & Veatch Corporation 






The development of a site for a power plant was complicated by the presence of pinnacled karst bedrock located beneath more than 24 meters 
(80 feet) of intermediate geo-materials (IGM). Shallow mat foundations had been planned in the conceptual design. Detailed subsurface 
investigations included an extensive supplemental drilling phase that identified a complex layer of pinnacled karst lying beneath a hard, nearly 
inelastic layer of residual IGM.  In an effort to keep the site on shallow foundations, the design team attempted a preload approach to pretest the 
load-bearing capacity of the potentially karst prone site. Project schedule constraints required the preload be removed and abandoned in lieu of 
more positive, fast-track solutions after detection of collapse-like movements.  With schedule milestones fast approaching, the project moved to 
conventional H-piles to expedite foundation construction.  The pile design effort included an indicator pile program with confirmation borings, a 
static load test and PDA testing.  Pile installations were installed up to a depth of 101 meters (332 feet) and rejections penetrated over 125 
meters (410 feet). Predicted averages for the project were met at 30 meters (100 feet). Project evolution included settlement plots for 28 shallow 






New power demands worldwide often require development of new 
generating stations.  Site selection for new generating stations is 
dictated by numerous factors and considerations, not the least of 
which may, perhaps be geology and topography.  Power producers 
often look for unpopulated or industrial areas, near intersections of 
existing transmission and fuel supplies (gas, oil or rail/coal), and 
near a generous, available water supply.  Site issues such as 
floodplains, seismicity, expansive soils, topography, and karst 
conditions are often economically balanced against transmission, 













Figure 1  
Site Location 
 
In late 2001, Black & Veatch was selected to provide engineering, 
procurement and construction for a new power plant in northeast 
Alabama.  The new generating station would provide northeast 
Alabama and many new developments, such as the new Honda 
Plant in nearby Lincoln, a dependable supply of electricity. The 
subject site is located in southwest Calhoun County, Alabama, 
between Birmingham and Atlanta.   
 
The southern end of the Appalachian Mountains around 
Birmingham is well known for karst activity.  The problems with 
karst development in the Birmingham area are well documented by 
George Sowers.  Most notably and invaluable to our work was the 
publication “Building on Sinkholes,” by George Sowers, published 
by ASCE (1996).  What is not well referenced is the areal extent of 
the karst prone area.  The unfortunate reality in underdeveloped, 
rural areas is that construction encounters with karst are rarely if at 
all documented, and can only be discovered through conversation 
with local residents and contractors.  A local Birmingham area 
engineer who was interviewed during the investigation had no 
knowledge of the karst terrain extending this far east of 
Birmingham.  As the project moved forward, more information 
about encounters with karst in the area began to surface, including 
the nearby Honda Plant, Telledega Superspeedway, and an 
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INVESTIGATION 
 
The preliminary investigation was planned to provide information 
to support foundation choices and support the development of the 
cost of foundations and grading.  There was no prior knowledge of 
soil or bedrock conditions other than the County Soil Survey and 
the State Geologic Map.  Preliminary review of existing literature 
showed the site was located within the Valley and Ridge 
physiographic provence of the Appalachian Highlands.  Local 
bedrock was identified as Ordovician and Cambrian aged dolomite 
and limestone. 
 
The field investigation included 10 conventional SPT borings 
planned to depths of 21.3 meters (70 feet).  Preliminary 
investigations typically estimate boring depths by the 2B rule of 
thumb, plus some additional length for good measure.  Given the 
upland topography, we anticipated encountering bedrock at some 
point prior to the planned depth. The largest foundation for this 
type of plant is the combustion turbine (CT) foundation, typically 
about 7.6 meters (25 feet) wide.  The field investigation also 
included piezometers, soil resistivity tests and test pits. 
 
There were a few surprises coming out of the investigation.  First, 
the depth to bedrock was greater than anticipated and second, the 
overburden soil was stiff to hard residual intermediate geo-material 
(IGM) throughout the borings.   The biggest surprise was finding a 
soft pocket of soil, just above bedrock in two of the ten borings, 
outside of the power block where the major foundations are 
located.  The soft zone was at a depth of over 25 meters (85 feet)!  
Here lies the great chasm between theory and practice.  Will a soft 
zone beneath 25 meters of IGM effect shallow foundation design?  
Our conclusion was  
that our 7.6 meter wide foundations would not be affected when 
following conventional consolidation theory.  But what about karst 
terrain and future sinkhole development or collapse?   
 
The final field investigation attempted to comprehensively probe 
the limits and extent of karst at the site. Thirty-three additional 
borings were advanced to refusal at the site with bedrock cores 
collected in eight of the borings.  What was found completely 
changed our opinion about the suitability of shallow foundations at 
the site.  The site was underlain by severely pinnacled limestone.  
 
The investigation started off in dramatic fashion with the first 
boring encountering much softer clay from the ground surface 
through the entire IGM zone, beneath one of the heaviest, most 
critical pieces of equipment. The rest of the borings were a mixed 
bag of strong IGM overlying either bedrock or soft clay.  The top of 
bedrock was defined at depths ranging from 10 meters (33 feet) to 
40 meters (132 feet). Borings extending beyond 21 meters found 
the signature soft, normally consolidated clay typically found  in 
slots between pinnacles of limestone.   The thickness of the slot 






We now had to address the uncertainty of the karst behavior over 
the life of the power plant.  We could not find a reference of a deep 
karst site in residual upland environments that had seen ravelling or 
collapse.  Sites with pinnacle or karst development at this depth are 




Figure 2  East-West Cross Section 
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Sowers suggests using pre-loads to simulate the weight of the 
foundations.  If the pre-load was too heavy for the pinnacled karst 
system to support, the overburden would crush the pinnacles or 
settle over the pinnacles until stable.  The entire process would 
occur faster and more immediately than typical consolidation 
theory would suggest, but just how fast was unknown.  The project 
went ahead with plans to preload the site with 4.6 meters (15 feet) 
of pre-load, on top of an already cut and filled plant site.  Maximum 
thickness of fill, including the preload, would reach nearly eight 
meters toward the east end of the site. If the pre-load triggered 
sinkholes or caused significant settlements, the project would 
review other options, including cap grouting or deep foundations.  
Local wisdom shared by engineers in the Birmingham area warned 
that both grouting and deep foundations were fraught with risk.  
Grouting could interrupt drainage, triggering collapse.  Deep 
foundations costs could be difficult to control with uncertain and 





The pre-load was scheduled for three months.  The monitoring plan 
incorporated both conventional settlement plates installed 
immediately beneath the preload, and borros anchors, drilled in and 
installed 25 meters below the plant grade.  The shallow plates 
would reflect an overall picture of settlements across the site.  The 
deep plates would identify how much settlement  was occurring in 
soft clay between the limestone pinnacles. 
 
Predicting the amount of settlement from consolidation tests was 
determined by what was thought to be fairly conservative 
measures.  Residual clays in the upper 20 to 25 meters crushed 
Shelby tubes, and the gravel content of the clay made quality 
sample selections very difficult.  As a result, only the softest soils at 
depth were characterized for consolidation characteristics.  The 
consolidation parameters from deeper soil were used to 
characterize the entire overburden thickness, resulting in a worst- 
case consolidation settlement prediction. 
 
The early settlement readings were variable.  Some areas showed 
no movement for weeks.  Others would settle one week, stop 











































Figure 3:  Settlement Plate Plan 
Settlement Plate (Typ) Borros Anchor (Typ) 
7 14 21 
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Figure 4.  Illustrates data from 8 settlement plates beneath a CT/transformer foundation.  Settlement data reflects characteristic recurring 
movement and stabilization reflecting the crushing behavior of the overburden.  The dashed deep plate, anchored just above bedrock 
reflected compression of the soft soil between pinnacles.  Stability was reflected in 23 of 28 plates at 70 days.  At 75 days, 3 of the 7 plates at 
Unit 2 (Not shown, westernmost foundation on fill) resumed movement, as well as plate 11 seen here. 
 
 
The settlement data (Figure 4) for the foundation near the center of 
the pre-load illustrates the chaotic behavior of the karst regime.   
The predicted consolidation is shown as the smooth, hyperbolic 
solid line.  The deep borros anchor is the dashed line.  Both 
shallow plate and deep anchor data illustrates the stop-start 
settlement behavior.   
 
At 75 days, the data appeared to be stabilizing.  Plans were 
underway to begin stripping preload at the west end of the pre-
load.  At 80 days, preload removal had begun when the final set of 
readings were collected.  However, unexpected news soon 
followed: several plates beneath the west and center foundations 
had begun moving again.  The stripping of pre-load was stopped.  
Predicting the remaining duration of the settlement and 
stabilization proved impossible.  Difficult decisions had to be made 
quickly to maintain the construction schedule. 
 
Early discussions with compaction grouting contractors turned up 
no guarantees.  Grouting contractors were expensive and  unwilling 
to warranty the results.  The project turned to steel H-piles to 
reduce risk to the major foundations and to maintain schedule.  The 
uncertainty of quantities were managed during construction.  
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Figure 5.  Final (total) settlement contours (distance in feet, settlement in inches).  Areas of the greatest settlement magnitude at the surface 
grade are shaded dark (bottom).  The circular nature of the concentrated settlement may reflect karst movement with maximum settlements 
over six cm.  Pile driving records reflect very deep cavities in the bedrock near settlement point 18 with piles reaching depths of over 60 to 90 
meters (200  to 300 feet).  Conversely, the relatively stable area near settlement 21 reflected very little movement, but piles reached the 
greatest depths on the project, with one rejected at a length of 124 meters (407 feet) and some meeting solid refusal at 93 to 101 meters (305 





The construction schedule drove the foundation design process.  
With major foundation construction scheduled to begin in a few 
weeks, Black & Veatch engineers set out to interview and hire a 
pile driving contractor, the Morris Group of Birmingham. Pile 
selection was determined by the availability of materials.  A large 
quantity of HP 12X63 pile happened to be available.  Pile tips 
would be protected using APF Hard-Bite pile points. Pile design 
capacity would be determined by results of a static load test and 




The design objective was to achieve a 534 KN (60-ton) pile with 
capacity developed through end bearing on sound limestone, 
located at an anticipated average of 100 to 110 feet beneath the 
site.  The capacity would also have to account for downdrag. 
 
Within two weeks of the decision to use piles, a four-pile
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Figure 6.  Indicator piles shown as solid black lines in elevation, over confirmatory offset boring,  represening the variability in the top of 
rock over very short horizontal distances.  HP 12X63 piles refused both above and below where confirmatory borings would indicate. 
 
indicator test program was underway.   The indicator piles were 
driven under each of the four major foundations.   First, four more 
borings were drilled at the indicator piles locations to determine the 
depth to competent rock. Refusal criteria and ultimate capacity 
were developed while driving the piles using a pile driving 
analyzer (PDA).  A full-scale static load test confirmed the results. 
  A refusal at five blows per 1.25 cm (five blows per ½ inch) 
resulted in the desired allowable capacity of 534 KN (60 tons). 
 
Pile driving hammers selection also proved difficult.  The most 
widely used hammer in the Birmingham area, the Delmag D19-42, 
was mobilized to the site for the indicator program.  It was quickly 
apparent the 54 KN-m (48,000 ft-lb) hammer could hardly 
penetrate the dense IGM overburden requiring between 50 and 100 
blows per 30 cm (50 to 100 bpf) from the ground surface to 
refusal.  The Morris Group switched to a Delmag D30-32 (102 
KN-m/75,000 ft-lb), significantly increasing the rate of penetration 
to rough average of 15 to 30 blows per 30 cm.    
 
The results of confirmatory drilling were mixed.  Piles were driven 
to refusal far deeper and shallower than borings offset only a few 
feet, confirming the extremely jagged nature of the pinnacled 
limestone surface (Figure 5).  Using the average lengths of the 
indicator pile, Black & Veatch estimated the quantity of pile for the 
project at nearly 12,200 lineal meters (40,000 linear feet) with an 
average length of 100 feet. 
 
The overall duration between the decision to switch the design to 
deep foundations and the completion of the test program was two 
weeks, with full scale production beginning in just three weeks. 
The demands of the construction schedule were met. 
Production Piling 
 
Pile behavior was typified by hard driving followed by abrupt 
refusal.  A smaller portion of piles exhibited a decreasing 
resistance for some distance above refusal.   
 
Definition and determination of rejected piles remained a work- in-
progress throughout the pile driving program.  The behavior of the 
piles while driving remained relatively consistent through the upper 
20 to 25 meter (70 to 80 foot) crust.  The upper crust did not 
reflect the typical erratic behavior exhibited by suspect piles below 
20 to 25 meters.   Piles that were advanced significantly beyond 
adjacent pile completions were flagged as suspect.  Re-evaluation 
of each suspect pile was repeated upon subsequent splices. All of 
the rejections were based on length or excessive lean (batter). 
Consideration was given for these long piles and their location in 
the mat, as well as the type of foundation.  Piles in the CT mat were 
required to take dynamic machine loads, and were held to a tighter 
rejection length than those in static foundations (exhaust stacks, 
transformers and fuel tank).  Piles were also evaluated based on 
their adjusted spring constant and whether the mat could handle the 
spring constant variability.   
 
When the major foundations were completed, the estimated 
average length of pile from the indicator program proved accurate. 
 The completed average pile length for the 357 production piles 
was only 2 inches longer than predicted.  The final rejection rate 
was just over 8%, far less than the predicted 15%.  Piling 
predictions and quantities for the fuel tank (located at the far east 
end of the site, where the worst predicted conditions were 
assumed) were far less favorable.  The completed average pile 
length for the fuel tank jumped up to 109 feet.  The rejection rate 
increased to 11%, still significantly less than the 15% prediction. 
Test Pile (TYP)
Confirmatory Boring (TYP)
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Figure 7.  Pile tip refusals for three rows of piles.  Each row is two to three meters apart. Illustrates the large settlement feature reflected in 

















Figure 8.  Surface of limestone bedrock, generated from fuel 
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Probable pile Stopping 
Point 360 ft
Probable Pile Stopping 
Point 340 ft
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Discoveries and Conversation 
 
Tools, such as conversation with property neighbors, would be 
very useful to the design process, but is largely impractical since 
design investigations are often pre-land-purchase and information 
regarding developments is usually confidential.   
 
During the pre-load period, the owner’s project manager walked 
along a potential fuel pipeline corridor, north of the site with the 
adjacent property owner.  When coming across dry pond, the 
property owner expounded on how he could not seem to plug the 
large holes in the bottom of his “pond.” Upon further 
reconnaissance and inspection, we discovered no tell-tail signs of 
an excavation.  No dam or spoils pile were evident, very unusual 
characteristics for an old pond.  The dry pond appears to be a very 
large, 30 meter by 60 meter sinkhole, three to five meters deep, 
with several one half meter to three meter diameter throats 
daylighting along the base.  The probable sinkhole is more than 
double the size of the largest foundation planned on site, and was 
located in dense woods, approximately 30 meters north of the 
property line.  
 
The neighbor bordering the south side of the site reported his 
ponds “flushing” right before his eyes some years prior to this 
project.  The neighbor clearly recalled watching his prized fish 
disappearing into the cavern.  The resourceful man borrowed a 
sheeps-foot roller and proceeded to plug the hole with compacted 




Figure 8. “Dry Pond” located on adjacent property, about 30  
meters north of the site. 
 
 
As time went on, more shallow depressions became apparent in the 
surrounding countryside, visible only as temporary ponds, which 
would appear in fields after large rainfall events and quickly 
disappear over the next few days.  These shallow depressions do 








Great caution should be exercised when investigating sites with 
underlying carbonate bedrock.  If preliminary borings had stopped 
in the hard overburden crust at a depth equal to two times the 
foundation width, the karst conditions would have gone undetected. 
 Some portion of any karst site investigation must examine the 
depth and condition of the bedrock.  Great care should be exercised 
when proceeding with foundation design.  
 
Driven pile foundations would not be the first choice given such 
deep karst conditions. However, pile foundations can be 
successfully driven in Deep Karst Terrain through hard IGM soils.  
Quantities can be reasonably predicted and controlled using tried 
and true indicator pile test programs coupled with static and 
dynamic load testing and a well defined refusal and rejection 
criteria. 
 
 
